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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  Road safety cameras can photograph your car running red lights.1  
Some bars record information on driver’s licenses to establish that their 
patrons are old enough to drink.2  The Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA) uses automated web crawlers3 to try to find illegal copies 
                                                 
*
 Harvard Law School ’08. Beginning in September 2008, the author will be an associate 
at Winston & Strawn LLP in San Francisco, CA. She would like to thank Jonathan 
Zittrain for his thoughtful comments and tremendous help crystallizing this article, as 
well as Peter Koellner of the Harvard Philosophy Department and Jim Waldo of Sun 
Microsystems and the Harvard Computer Science Department. Thanks are also due to the 
many whose scholarship, lectures, or conversation influenced and inspired portions of 
this work, including Randy Barnett, Terry Fisher, Allan Friedman, Abel Roasa, Michael 
Smith, Mark Tushnet, and all those who took part in Harvard’s Computer Science 199r 
course in Spring 2007. 
1
 See Tom Harris, How Red-Light Cameras Work, Howstuffworks.com, 
http://auto.howstuffworks.com/red-light-camera.htm/printable (last visited Nov. 10, 
2007). 
2
 See Jennifer 8. Lee, Welcome to the Database Lounge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002 at 
G1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/21/technology/circuits/21DRIV.html. 
3
 A web crawler is a program that methodically scans or “crawls” through Internet pages 
to create an index of the data it is looking for.  See WiseGeek.com, What is a Web 
Crawler?, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-web-crawler.htm (last visited June 4, 
2007). 
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of mp3s,4 and iTunes embeds personal identifying information in the 
tracks of every song you buy.5  
 
[2]  Both public and private parties are harnessing technology to enforce 
law more accurately and efficiently, approaching a “perfect enforcement” 
of some laws.  These measures are often more accurate and less costly 
than hiring dozens of investigators and police officers to do similar work.6  
However, the invasiveness and omnipresence of these measures can make 
those who are monitored feel downright uncomfortable.  
 
[3]  “Uncomfortable” is not much to hang your hat on.  Those who are 
quick to express concern that “they” are watching us can appear alarmist.  
Yet, many feel that there is a real and very significant cost to using 
technology to enforce laws.  But what is it?  
 
[4]  A few legal writers, notably Daniel Solove,7 Eugene Volokh,8 and 
Jonathan Zittrain,9 have discussed the use of perfect law enforcing 
technologies.  Yet, relatively little has been written on the subject.  There 
are many kinds of law enforcing technologies, and each raises a variety of 
concerns.  This article provides a framework which can be used to 
determine the wisdom of using a technology to enforce law by explaining 
                                                 
4
 See RIAA, Worldwide Music Industry Coordinates Its Strategy Against Piracy, Oct. 28, 
1999, 
http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?news_year_filter=&resultpage=114&id=323A12AC-
539B-2909-BC1F-654DD1644E9E (last visited Apr. 10, 2008); see also Declan 
McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for Erroneous Letters, CNETNews.com, May 13, 2003, 
http://news.com.com/2102-1025_3-1001319.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008) [hereinafter 
McCullagh, Erroneous Letters]. 
5
 See ‘Personal Data’ in iTunes Tracks, BBC NEWS, June 1, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/ 
6711215.stm (last visited Apr. 10, 2008). 
6
 See e.g., Posting of Randy Picker to the University of Chicago Law School Faculty 
Blog, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/05/more_driving_do.html (May 26, 
2006, 15:59 CST); Posting of Daniel J. Solove to Concurring Opinions, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/ 
10/do_we_really_wa_1.html (Oct. 12, 2005, 00:15 EST). 
7
 See Solove, supra note 6. 
8
 See Eugene Volokh, Traffic Enforcement Cameras, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2002, at A22, 
available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/cameras.htm. 
9
 See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET — AND HOW TO STOP IT 103-
17 (2008). 
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the several types of perfect enforcement and analyzing the concerns raised 
by their use. 
 
[5]  When considering whether to use technology to enforce law, a 
decision-maker should make four determinations.  First, is the aversion to 
using the technology an aversion to the method of enforcing the law or a 
disagreement with the underlying substantive law?  Second, will the 
technology effectively enforce the law?  Third, is the use of the 
technology constitutional?  And finally, does the technology trigger any 
other philosophical concerns? 
 
[6]  In some cases, the use of technology will plainly be justified or 
unjustified.  More often, the appropriateness of using technology will 
depend on the particular facts and circumstances of its use.  Even when 
these grey situations arise, this article’s structure and explanation of 
concerns can be used as a means to help legislators, law enforcers, and 
policymakers make more informed decisions about when technology 
should be used to enforce law. 
 
II. WHAT KIND OF PERFECT ENFORCEMENT? 
 
[7]  “Perfect enforcement” can come in several forms.  This article is 
principally concerned with two, perfect prevention and perfect 
surveillance, but will discuss a third, perfect correction, briefly. 
 
[8]  A technology which “perfectly prevents” a law violation preempts the 
law violation entirely.10  Perfect prevention technology includes Digital 
Rights Management (“DRM”) systems, which prevent access and copying 
of media.  A perfect prevention technology can also be indirect; for 
example government systems designed to identify terrorist attacks before 
they take place qualify as a prevention technology. 
 
[9]  A “perfect surveillance” technology would not interfere with the act of 
violating the law but would detect every instance of its violation.11  
                                                 
10
 Jonathan Zittrain has identified this type of perfect enforcement by another name.  Id. 
at 108 (identifying “preemption” as a type of perfect enforcement). 
11
 Id. at 109-10.  Michael Adler’s “perfect search” would also be an example of a 
technology designed to perfectly punish.  See Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General 
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Technologies which aspire to “perfectly survey” include red light traffic 
cameras and the RIAA’s web crawlers.  Unlike DRM, the web crawlers do 
not interfere with the copying or distribution of media; they merely 
identify the source of the media.  The RIAA then uses the information the 
web crawler discovered to file a law suit against providers of the illegally 
copied media.12 
 
[10]  Other types of perfect enforcement which are not considered at 
length in this article include what Jonathan Zittrain terms “specific 
injunction”13 but which might more broadly be called “perfect correction.”  
Perfect correction is possible when a piece of technology continues to 
communicate with its manufacturer; examples include Digital Video 
Recorders (DVRs) or computer software that is set to receive automatic 
updates.14  Perfect enforcement by correction would occur if a 
manufacturer retroactively “undid” harms after their occurrence, either by 
court order or its own volition.15  A recent example of this was the remote 
reprogramming of Apple iPhones which had been altered to work on 
multiple mobile networks.16  Another example is TiVo, Inc.  v. Echostar 
Communications Corp., in which a district court ordered the company 
Echostar to stop most of the DVR boxes it had already sold from 
functioning because they infringed patents owned by TiVo.17 
 
[11]  This article is primarily concerned with perfect prevention and 
punishment, although many concerns raised about perfect prevention are 
also relevant to perfect correction. 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
Searches, and Digital Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 
105 YALE L.J. 1093 (1996).  
12
 Worldwide Music Industry Coordinates Its Strategy Against Piracy, supra note 4. 
13
 ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 108-09. 
14
 Id. 
15
 Id. at 109. 
16
 See Apple iPhone Warning Proves True, BBC NEWS, Sept. 28, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
Technology/7017660.stm (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).  
17
 TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, remanded, 516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  For an extended 
discussion of TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Communications Corp., and its implications, see 
ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 103–04, 108.  
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III. AVERSIONS TO THE UNDERLYING SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
 
[12]  As mentioned in the introduction, the idea of perfect law 
enforcement makes people nervous.  But is this nervousness misplaced?  
Some of the discomfort comes not from concerns about privacy or 
government power, but from a concrete disagreement with the substance 
of laws themselves.  Consider how many individuals consume alcohol at 
least once before they are twenty-one, smoke marijuana, break the speed 
limit, or pirate media.  Many of these lawbreakers are generally law-
abiding and productive members of society.  Furthermore, many of these 
lawbreakers are also principled about their lawbreaking; they believe the 
laws are poorly crafted or simply wrong and do not consider themselves 
immoral. 
 
[13]  Thus, it is unsurprising when, for instance, someone in favor of the 
legalization of marijuana is opposed to random drug testing.  As it has not 
been politically feasible to repeal anti-drug laws, proponents of marijuana 
use may find more political success by opposing drug testing on the 
grounds that it is a violation of privacy.  Their objection to testing may 
have little if anything to do with privacy and everything to do with their 
opposition to the substance of anti-drug laws.  In cases of this type, 
aversion to technology can merely be a proxy for aversion to the law. 
 
[14]  Opposition to a technology can also be inspired when individuals 
oppose only some enforcements of a law.  In 2000, the Hawaii 
transportation department began using cameras mounted on vans to catch 
anyone driving six or more miles over the speed limit.18  One journalist 
observed, “it became possibly the most hated public policy initiative in 
Hawaii’s history, almost uniformly disliked, even by those who thought it 
actually worked.”19  The program was cancelled in 2002, largely due to 
public outcry.20  Afterwards, traffic violations were detected the old-
fashioned and less-perfect way.  Daniel Solove hypothesized that the 
outcry could be explained by individuals’ ambivalent views towards 
                                                 
18
 See Solove, supra note 6. 
19
 Mike Leidemann, Few Saying Aloha to Van Cams Fondly, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, 
Apr. 14, 2002, available at 
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2002/Apr/14/ln/ln05a.html. 
20
 Id.  See also Solove, supra note 6. 
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speeding laws.21  While people generally agree with speeding laws, they 
also believe there are many occasions when it is permissible to violate 
them.22 
 
[15]  In contrast to the above examples, Eugene Volokh has suggested that 
“broader and more evenhanded enforcement will generally (not always, 
but usually) lead to improvements in the law.  If lots of citizens get pulled 
over for speeding, and the limit also ends up making everyone else drive 
too slowly, City Hall will react.”23  Volokh’s vision of using better 
enforcement to fuel the revision of poorly crafted laws is plausible but 
may not always come to pass.  Few who hope for a bright future in politics 
will risk fallout from suggesting that maybe speeders, amateur music 
pirates, or those who do not wear seatbelts should not be reprimanded.  
While some very unpopular laws may be changed, politicians may avoid 
altering controversial laws for fear of losing their own popularity in a 
public relations mishap.  On the other hand, avoiding the use of an 
enforcement technology because the public does not fully agree with a law 
smacks of absurdity, especially as it will result in a more random portion 
of the lawbreaking population being caught.24 
 
[16]  Determining whether enforcement technologies should be opposed if 
a law is unjust is beyond the scope of this article.  However, as the 
discussion in this article progresses, one should be careful not to conflate a 
concern about a law with a concern about an enforcement technology.  
Separating these concerns will allow objections to the technology to be 
                                                 
21
 Solove, supra note 6. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Eugene Volokh, Questions Following Traffic Enforcement Cameras, 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/ 
cameras.htm (last visited June 18, 2007). 
24
 While beyond the scope of this Article, in cases where a law is generally just, it may be 
wise to add a human, discretionary element into a system of near-perfect enforcement.  
For example, Hawaii could keep its “traffic vans,” but instead of ticketing everyone who 
drove six miles over the speed limit, an individual would have to make an independent 
judgment about whether the ticket was justified.  Thus, those speeding to keep up with 
the flow of traffic or on a virtually empty road could be spared, but those dangerously 
zigzagging between lanes or traffic would be punished more often.  This exercise in 
discretion will fit better with the public’s conception of a fair application of the law, and 
the more targeted enforcement will result in greater fairness and punishment of those who 
deserve reprimand. 
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made more clearly by taking the focus off the substance of the law and 
placing it on the law enforcement method itself.  
 
IV. LOGISTICAL CONCERNS 
 
[17]  If technology were always accurate and lawmakers could always 
foresee the effects of their decisions, one might be very tempted to 
embrace perfect enforcement of law.  But this utopia is not the world we 
live in.  Computer programs can make mistakes, laws can be unjust, and 
even the best laid plans can have horrific, unintended side effects. Even if 
using technology to enforce law were a good idea in theory, does it have a 
shot in practice?  This section will discuss the logistical objections to 
using technology to enforce law, by identifying situations when using 
technology to enforce law should be avoided. 
 
A. FEASIBILITY 
 
[18]  In contrast to the examples in the previous section, there are some 
areas of law where general consensus exists.  Almost everyone wants to 
prevent terrorist attacks and supports some kind of government action to 
prevent them.  With stakes so high and emotions so volatile, the idea of 
finding terrorists by analyzing transactional data is appealing.  Yet, law 
enforcers must realistically assess if their goals are possible before 
spending tax dollars and aggregating personal information (two activities 
which, we will stipulate, are undesirable standing alone).  Consider, for 
example, some of the government programs following the attack on the 
World Trade Center in 2001. 
 
[19]  After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many suggested 
that the attacks could have been prevented if American intelligence 
agencies could have better “connected the dots.”25  The attackers had acted 
suspiciously before the hijackings — taking flight lessons, purchasing last-
minute one-way plane tickets using cash, and participating in suspicious 
                                                 
25
 “Certain agencies and apologists talk about connecting the dots, but one of the 
problems is to know which dots to connect.”  Remarks as prepared for delivery by Dr. 
John Poindexter, Director, Information Awareness Office of DARPA, at DARPATech 
2002 Conference (Aug. 2, 2002), http://www.fas.org/irp/ 
agency/dod/poindexter.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008). 
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banking activity.26  Looking backwards in time, it is easy to see how these 
extremists could have been planning a terrorist attack.  But could an attack 
be anticipated by looking forward? 
 
[20]  There is a prima facie sense that the September 11th hijackers could 
have been identified and linked to one another.  Hijackers Nawaq Alhamzi 
and Khalid Al-Midhar bought tickets to fly on American Airlines Flight 
77 (which was flown into the Pentagon) using their real names.27  Both 
were on the State Department/INS watch list called TIPOFF and both 
were sought by the FBI and CIA as suspected terrorists because they had 
been seen at a meeting with other terrorists in Malaysia.28  From their 
identities, authorities could have discovered three more of the hijackers.29  
One shared an address with Alhamzi and also bought a seat on American 
Airlines Flight 77.30  More importantly, authorities might have discovered 
Mohamed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi, who shared an address with Al-
Midhar and who bought tickets on the two flights which flew into the 
World Trade Center towers.31 
 
[21]  Two systems of particular relevance were proposed to anticipate 
terrorist activity: the more modestly-aimed Computer Assisted Passenger 
Pre-screening System II (“CAPPS II”)32 and the grander Total Information 
Awareness (“TIA”).33  These programs were attempts at perfect 
prevention, designed to anticipate criminal activity and more-perfectly 
prevent it. 
 
[22]  The CAPPS II system would have airlines ask passengers for four 
pieces of information: full name, date of birth, home address, and home 
                                                 
26
 MARKLE FOUNDATION TASK FORCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE, PROTECTING AMERICA’S FREEDOM IN THE INFORMATION AGE 28 (Oct. 2002), 
available at http://www.markle.org/downloadable_assets/nstf_full.pdf. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. 
31
 Id. 
32
 Press Release, Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: CAPPS II at a Glance (Feb. 12, 2004), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0347.shtm. 
33See Military Intelligence System Draws Controversy, CNN.com, Nov. 20, 2002, 
http://archives.cnn.com/ 
2002/US/11/20/terror/tracking/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2008). 
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telephone number.34   With this information, the system would “conduct a 
risk assessment” using “commercially available data and current 
intelligence information” to determine if a passenger is “no risk, unknown 
or elevated risk, or high risk.”35  While the phrase “commercially available 
data” is not explained, it likely includes the kind of information available 
from private corporations such as ChoicePoint, which aggregate and sell 
records of an individual’s criminal activity, education, financial history, 
employment, and residences, as well as other information.36 
 
[23]  According to several officials who worked closely on CAPPS II, but 
who declined to speak publicly about it, officials first “sought to identify 
passengers who were not ‘deeply rooted’ in a community,” moving often 
or lacking an established credit history.37  But the system produced too 
many false positives, identifying many airline passengers as “risky” who 
were little threat.38  “I am just not prepared to say that because someone 
can’t get a mortgage, they are a terrorist threat to an airplane,” said a 
former official, speaking to the Washington Post on condition of 
anonymity.39  “These data aggregator products are used today in the 
financial world to identify certain things, and they’re not designed to 
identify potential terrorist threats.”40 
 
[24]  Of greater aspirations and greater failure was the Total Information 
Awareness program (“TIA”) (also known as Terrorism Information 
Awareness), for which Congress eliminated funding in the Fall of 2003.41  
                                                 
34
 Press Release, supra note 32. 
35
 Id. 
36
 See ChoicePoint, http://www.choicepoint.com (last visited June 4, 2007); ChoiceTrust, 
http://www.choicetrust.com (last visited June 4, 2007).  
37
 Arshad Mohammed & Sara K. Goo, Government Increasingly Turning to Data Mining, 
WASH. POST, June 15, 2006, at D03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/14/ 
AR2006061402063.html. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id.  
41
 James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2004).  The law which eliminated funding stated, 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds 
appropriated or otherwise made available in this or any other Act may 
be obligated for the Terrorism Information Awareness Program: 
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Unlike CAPPS II, which assessed the risk of particular subjects, TIA 
attempted to use a “pattern based” search to find potential terrorists.  
Pattern-based searches look for information which matches or departs 
from a pattern, instead of searching for instances of a particular 
individual’s activity.42  TIA’s goal was to detect terrorist activities from 
the billions of commercial transactions occurring in society every day.43 
 
[25]  While many were concerned with whether TIA would violate an 
individual’s privacy,44 few expressed concern about whether the program 
                                                                                                                         
Provided, [t]hat this limitation shall not apply to the program hereby 
authorized for Processing, analysis, and collaboration tools for 
counterterrorism foreign intelligence, as described in the Classified 
Annex accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 
2004, for which funds are expressly provided in the National Foreign 
Intelligence Program for counterterrorism foreign intelligence 
purposes. 
(b) None of the funds provided for Processing, analysis, and 
collaboration tools for counterterrorism foreign intelligence shall be 
available for deployment or implementation except for: 
(1) lawful military operations of the United States conducted outside 
the United States; or 
(2) lawful foreign intelligence activities conducted wholly overseas, or 
wholly against non-United States citizens. 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8131(a)–(b), 117 Stat. 
1054, 1102 (2004).  Four research programs of the Information Awareness Office were 
continued, but none were related to “pattern analysis” or “data mining.”  See H.R. CONF. 
REP. NO. 108-283, at 327 (2003), as reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1168, 1189. 
42
 See Dempsey & Flint, supra note 41, at 1464.  
43
 See John Poindexter, Director, Information Awareness Office of DARPA, Remarks at 
DARPA Tech 2002 Conference (Aug. 2, 2002), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/poindexter.html.  
44
 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Under a Watchful Eye: Incursions on Personal 
Privacy, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS 128, 132 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr., 
eds., 2003) (“At the extreme [datamining] could be a vehicle for politically motivated 
spying and intimidation reminiscent of the worst features of the J. Edgar Hoover era.”); 
William Safire, You Are a Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A35 (“[John] 
Poindexter is now realizing his 20-year dream: getting the ‘data-mining’ power to snoop 
on every public and private act of every American . . . . Poindexter’s assault on individual 
privacy rides roughshod over such oversight.  He is determined to break down the wall 
between commercial snooping and secret government intrusion.”); American Civil 
Liberties Union: Q&A on the Pentagon’s “Total Information Awareness” Program, 
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/15578res20030420.html (last visited June 5, 2007) 
(“[TIA] would kill privacy in America.”). 
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could be effective at all. The “pattern based” search approach dramatically 
increases the amount of actions that must be watched and, more 
relevantly, increases the sets of actions that must be watched.45  Unlike 
CAPPS II, TIA would have to identify one person’s identity across 
databases without a reliable “starting place,” such as the plane ticket 
purchase which triggers a CAPPS II investigation.46  While driver’s 
license numbers and social security numbers uniquely identify an 
individual, they are often not recorded in commercial transactions, such as 
paying for flight lessons or buying products which could be used in 
explosives. 
 
[26]  The TIA was not merely interested in individuals, but rather patterns 
of behavior, which could occur among small groups of terrorists working 
together.47  For a population of n people, the set of all sets of those people 
is 2n.48  Certainly this is astronomically larger than the sets worth 
watching, but even for a small population, the number of sets worth 
surveillance is probably going to be larger than the number of atoms in the 
universe, which is estimated to be between 2240 and 2320.49  Even if we 
were only watching the activities of sixty-four people, the number of 
possible sets of those people exceeds the address space of the largest 
server computers which existed in 2003.50 
 
[27]  Suppose also that on a particular day there are 10,000 applications 
for a visa or passport, 10,000 applications for a driver’s license, 10,000 
airline ticket purchases, and 10,000 purchases of nitrogen fertilizer.  If a 
terrorist were working with partners or using different identities, the 
program would need to determine if any of the combinations of 
transactions was suspicious.  In this case, there are 10,0004 or 
                                                 
45
 See e.g. Dempsy & Flint, supra note 41, at 1464 (explaining that pattern-based 
searches involve searching “large databases when the query does not name a specific 
individual, address, identification number, or other personally identifiable data element . . 
. .”). 
46
 See id. at 1466 (“[P]attern-based searches involve queries in the absence of 
particularized suspicion for data patterns believed to be associated with terrorism.”). 
47
 Jim Waldo, Analysis of TIA Technology on Privacy (Mar. 17, 2003) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author).  The author is very grateful to Dr. Waldo for permitting 
her to describe his analysis of TIA in this article. 
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
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10,000,000,000,000,000 (ten thousand trillion) combinations, assuming 
(falsely) that only transactions made on the same day are relevant.51 
 
[28]  The TIA could have been effective if it were only watching the 
transactions of a few particular individuals under suspicion.  But looking 
only at pre-determined suspicious individuals misses the point of the 
program — to determine who is suspicious from the patterns of behavior. 
 
[29]  For those concerned about the costs of perfect law enforcement, the 
lesson from TIA and CAPPS II is that the wisdom of using technology to 
enforce laws (or, in this case, to prevent the breaking of laws) is a function 
not only of the need for the technology but also of the effectiveness.  
Individuals and tax payers should resist privacy-invading, expensive 
programs when positive results are non-existent.  Similarly, bureaucrats 
and lawmakers should consider carefully the technological feasibility of a 
program before implementing it. 
 
B. ACCURACY 
 
[30]  A second logistical concern about using technology to catch 
instances of lawbreaking is that the technology may be inaccurate.  
Consider red light cameras, which automatically photograph cars entering 
and speeding through an intersection, usually printing on the photo the 
date, time, location, speed of the car, and elapsed time between when the 
light turned red and the car entered the intersection.52  Sometimes, the 
cameras have been known to make mistakes.53  However, red light 
                                                 
51
 Id. at 9–10. 
52
 For more details on how red light cameras function, see Tom Harris, Howstuffworks 
“How Red-light Cameras Work,” http://auto.howstuffworks.com/red-light-
camera.htm/printable (last visited June 7, 2007). 
53
 See, e.g., Molly Smithsimon, Private Lives, Public Spaces: The Surveillance State, 
DISSENT, Winter 2003, at 43, available at http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=534 
(“After data were released in San Diego, the court threw out hundreds of traffic tickets.  
The data showed that accidents at monitored intersections actually increased.  The city’s 
vendor company (Lockheed Martin IMS) had shortened the yellow-light time to capture 
more offenders.”); Nicholas J. Garber et al., An Evaluation of Red Light Camera (Photo-
Red) Enforcement Programs in Virginia: A Report in Response to a Request by 
Virginia’s Secretary of Transportation 91-93 (Jan. 2005), 
http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/05-vdot.pdf (discussing possible malfunctions of 
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cameras catch many law violators at intersections that the police simply do 
not have the manpower to patrol. 
 
[31]  A citation from a red light camera produces unease because the 
average person does not know how to challenge it.  If a police officer had 
seen the driver run a light, the driver could attempt to undermine the 
officer’s account of events. Were you wearing your glasses?  When did 
you see the light change?  Did your partner in the squad car notice the 
light was red as well?  The only way to undermine the camera, however, is 
by determining if it was functioning properly, which might require 
technological savvy beyond that of the typical driver.  
 
[32]  Needing technical expertise or needing to hire an expert witness to 
challenge a ticket, however, should not be conflated with a lack of 
confidence in the accuracy of the camera.  Indeed, a faulty camera is more 
likely to be noticed than an officer who typically tickets people who did 
not actually run lights, because a camera’s accuracy can easily be 
empirically tested.  Mere unease with technology, with the strangeness of 
a machine claiming that a law has been broken, is a poor reason to resist 
its use. 
 
[33]  Whether a technology inaccurately identifies law breaking is 
important even if mistaken identifications can be corrected in court.  This 
is especially true if false positives place great burdens on individuals 
wrongly accused.  Consider, for example, how the Recording Industry 
Association of America (“RIAA”) uses automated web crawlers to scour 
the Internet and find material being distributed in violation of federal 
copyright law.54  Several times in the past few years, innocent individuals 
were greatly inconvenienced by mistakes made by the RIAA web 
crawlers.  
 
                                                                                                                         
the cameras and the possibility of false positives) (cited in ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 291 
n.74). 
54
 See Declan McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for Threatening Letter (May 12, 2003), 
http://www.news.com/2100-1025_3-1001095.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008) 
[hereinafter McCullagh, Threatening Letter]. 
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[34]  In May 2003, the RIAA sent a DMCA notice55 to Penn State 
University alleging that one of the astronomy and astrophysics 
department’s FTP sites was unlawfully distributing songs by musician 
Peter Usher.56  The site had been flagged because a folder contained the 
work of a professor emeritus Peter Usher and because the site hosted an 
mp3 file of an a cappella song performed by astronomers.57  In the days 
that followed, the RIAA admitted that it had erroneously sent dozens of 
copyright infringement notices.58  In an e-mail sent to CNETNews.com, 
the RIAA explained that “individuals look at each and every notice we 
send out.  In this particular instance, a temp employee made a mistake and 
did not follow RIAA’s established protocol . . . .”59 The RIAA also 
admitted that it does not require its copyright enforcers to listen to 
allegedly infringing songs.60 
 
[35]  In a similar incident, the RIAA threatened to sue an innocent woman 
for sharing copyrighted music.  Sarah Ward, a sixty-six year old retired 
school teacher, was accused of downloading “I’m a Thug” by rapper Trick 
Daddy, among other songs.61  A self-described “computer neophyte,” 
Ward’s computer could not have downloaded the infringing songs.62  She 
only used a Macintosh, which could not run the file-sharing program 
Kazaa that she was accused of using.63 
 
[36]  The RIAA sued Ward because Comcast had assigned her the Internet 
Protocol (“IP”) address associated with infringing Kazaa user Heath7.64  
Although it is less clear in this case what caused the error, there are 
                                                 
55
 Under section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), copyright 
owners such as the RIAA can request Internet service providers remove or disable access 
to copyrighted material and can subpoena an Internet service provider to discover the 
name of a copyright infringer using their servers or network.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)–(3), 
(h) (2000). 
56
 McCullagh, Threatening Letter, supra note 54. 
57
 Id.  
58
 McCullagh, Erroneous Letters, supra note 4. 
59McCullagh, Threatening Letter, supra note 54.   
60
 Id.   
61
 Chris Gaither, Recording Industry Withdraws Suit: Mistaken Identity Raises Questions 
on Legal Strategy, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2003, at C1. 
62
 Id. 
63
 Id.. 
64
 Id. 
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several possibilities.  Comcast could have matched the wrong name to the 
IP address provided by the RIAA, or the RIAA could have misidentified 
the IP address.65  
 
[37]  The RIAA is understandably reluctant to eliminate web crawlers 
because they can identify more instances of infringement than can be 
identified by a team of humans.  But, by including a human component to 
check the findings of the web crawlers (as the RIAA purportedly does), 
false positives can be limited while maintaining the efficacy of the 
technology.  The human component is critical because of the burdens that 
incorrect accusations of file-sharing can cause, such as shouldering the 
cost of hiring defense lawyers or paying a settlement agreement.  
 
C. ABUSE AND UNINTENDED SIDE EFFECTS 
 
[38]  Sometimes, even using accurate and effective technology to enforce 
laws can be harmful due to unintended side effects.  Some technologies 
which aggregate data for ostensibly good uses can later be used to cause 
harm.  Discovering and using personal information to cause harm is 
nothing new; in 1989, for example, actress Rebecca Schaeffer was shot at 
her home by a stalker.66  He had found her by hiring a private investigator 
to obtain her address from her California Motor Vehicle Record.67 
Schaeffer’s death was an unintended and horrific result of a data-gathering 
program.  The government was not abusing its power, yet the existence 
and accessibility of the information allowed someone else to cause harm. 
 
[39]  Information on driver’s licenses is not just being kept by 
Departments of Motor Vehicles anymore.  Businesses can also gain access 
                                                 
65
 Id. 
66
 See John T. Cross, Age Verification in the 21st Century: Swiping Away Your Privacy, 
23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 363, 370 (2005). 
67
 See EPIC DPPA and Driver’s License Privacy Page, 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/drivers/ (last visited June 7, 2007).  Following a series of 
incidents like this, Congress passed the Drivers Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”) to 
prevent the release of personal information “about any individual obtained by the 
department in connection with a motor vehicle record . . .” although the statute includes 
exceptions for disclosures “[f]or use by any licensed private investigative agency or 
licensed security service for any purpose permitted under this subsection[,]” which is 
precisely how Schaeffer’s stalker acquired her address.  18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)(1), (b)(8) 
(2000). 
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to the information.  Increasingly, states are issuing drivers licenses with a 
magnetic strip or barcode which can be scanned.68 Some states encrypt 
some of the data included on the licenses so they can only be used for law 
enforcement purposes, but others do not.69  The included data can be 
basic, such as a name, address, and license expiration date, or can be more 
personal and distinctive, such as a social security number, electronic 
fingerprint or signature image.70  Although many businesses scan driver’s 
licenses to prevent underage patrons from purchasing tobacco or alcohol, 
only a few states regulate what can be recorded or when licenses can be 
swiped.  In Texas, a business may not keep information obtained from a 
scan in a database unless required to do so by the Texas alcohol 
commission.71  New Hampshire entirely prohibits the swiping of licenses 
to verify age.72  In Ohio, a business may store only a name, date of birth, 
                                                 
68
 Cross, supra note 66, at 363-64.  The current swipe-able state of driver’s licenses is a 
far cry from the past, when many licenses did not even include pictures.  However, the 
use of driver’s licenses as positive identification instead of as mere licenses to drive a 
motor vehicle was lost some time ago.  In one particularly memorable anecdote, after 
vetoing a bill to put photos on driver’s licenses twice, Tennessee Governor Lamar 
Alexander visited the White House.  When the guard asked him for a photo identification, 
he replied, “We don't have them in Tennessee.  I vetoed them.”  The guard said, “You 
can’t get in without one.’”  Alexander was finally admitted when the Governor of 
Georgia, who did have his photo on his driver’s license, vouched for Alexander’s 
identity.  Lamar Alexander, Much as I Hate It, We Need a National ID, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 30, 2005, at A15. 
69
 Positive Access FAQs, http://www.positiveaccess.com/html/faqs.html (last visited June 
7, 2007): 
Some states and provinces have encrypted the ID data on their licenses 
for various reasons of law enforcement control and/or individual 
privacy protection. In several cases, these state’s [sic] with encrypted 
data have released information to [legitimate scanning organizations]. . 
. . [I]n [ ] other instances, the states maintain a strict policy of limiting 
the release of encryption codes to law enforcement agencies. 
70
 See Swipe, http://www.we-swipe.us/research.html#info (last visited June 7, 2007). 
71
 TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 109.61(a)–(b) (Vernon 2004); see also Cross, supra 
note 66, at 372–73 (discussing the statute in greater depth). 
72
 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:12(X) (2003) (“It shall be a misdemeanor for any person 
to: (X) Knowingly scan, record, retain, or store in any electronic form or format, personal 
information, as defined in RSA 260:14, obtained from any license, unless authorized by 
the department.”); see also Cross, supra note 66, at 373–74 (discussing the statute in 
greater depth). 
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license expiration date, and license number.73  Similarly, Connecticut only 
permits businesses to record patrons’ names, birthdates, license expiration 
dates, and identification numbers.74  Other states apparently encourage the 
use of license scanning devices.  West Virginia, for instance, allows a 
business to use the performance of a scan as an affirmative defense to 
charges of selling alcohol or tobacco to a minor.75 
 
[40]  As so few states regulate the scanning of licenses by private 
businesses, this use of technology to perfectly enforce the underage 
drinking and tobacco use laws may have some significant unintended side 
effects, such as violent crime.76  Many businesses automatically store 
whatever information their scanners can decode.77  Scanner manufacturers 
allow businesses to store scanned information in a local on-site database.78 
A bar employee fairly easily could make a list of all customers’ home 
addresses who were of a certain age and physical type.79  It would be easy 
                                                 
73
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.021(D)(1) (LexisNexis 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4301.61(D)(1) (LexisNexis 2003); see also Cross, supra note 66, at 374–78 (discussing 
the statute in greater depth). 
74
 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-86(d)(1) (2003): 
No permittee or permittee’s agent or employee shall electronically or 
mechanically record or maintain any information derived from a 
transaction scan, except the following: (A) The name and date of birth 
of the person listed on the driver’s license or identity card presented by 
a cardholder; (B) the expiration date and identification number of the 
driver’s license or identity card resented by a cardholder; 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-344(e)(1) (2003): 
No seller or seller’s agent or employee shall electronically or 
mechanically record or maintain any information derived from a 
transaction scan, except the following: (A) The name and date of birth 
of the person listed on the driver’s license or identity card presented by 
a cardholder; (B) the expiration date and identification number of the 
driver’s license or identity card presented by a cardholder;  
see also Cross, supra note 66, at 378–79 (discussing the statute in greater depth). 
75
 W. VA. CODE § 60-3A-25a (2004); see also Cross, supra note 66, at 381 (discussing 
the statute in greater depth). 
76Cross, supra note 66, at 392.   
77
 Id. 
78
 Lee, supra note 2 (“[W]ith Intelli-Check’s scanners and those of many other 
manufacturers, the information is stored locally, with the client gaining easy access.”). 
79
 See Kim Zetter, Great Taste, Less Privacy, WIRED, Feb. 6, 2004, available at 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2004/02/62182. 
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to take advantage of the available information and use it towards 
malicious ends. 
 
[41]  Data-gathering by well-intentioned governments can also lay the 
groundwork for abuse by future governments.  In Nazi Germany, South 
Africa, and Rwanda, information about religion, ethnicity and tribal 
affiliation, which was originally gathered with more innocent intentions, 
was later used to facilitate genocide and apartheid.80  In Rwanda, race was 
included on the national identification card a full sixty years before it 
became a tool of genocide.81  Even if the government always remains a 
good actor, the use of scanning devices could still allow vast quantities of 
information about individuals to be stored and aggregated by private 
individuals.  There are no guarantees about what the future holds, so 
governments and businesses should check themselves and their future 
selves by avoiding unnecessary data collection. 
 
[42]  For those who believe alcohol and tobacco should be kept away from 
minors, eliminating card swiping to prevent underage consumption would 
be unfortunate.  However, there are options which can minimize both 
abuse and lawbreaking.  As Eugene Volokh succinctly postulated, “it’s 
important that the potential for abuse is limited and limitable. . . . Instead 
of denying potentially useful tools to the police, we should think about 
what control mechanisms we can set up to make abuse less likely.”82  In 
this case, states could take greater measures to regulate what can be done 
with scanned data and what can be stored.  Perhaps disallowing any 
information storage strikes the ideal balance, minimizing both underage 
alcohol and tobacco use and the potential for abuse. 
 
[43]  Generally speaking, whether a technology should be used depends on 
how easily abuse can be limited.  In the case of scanning licenses, 
increased regulation may be enough to prevent significantly dangerous 
abuse; if no information is saved from a scan, the potential for abuse is 
greatly diminished and much abuse simply cannot happen.  However, the 
                                                 
80
 Testimony of Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies, Cato Institute, to the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Will REAL ID Actually Make Us Safer? An 
Examination of Privacy and Civil Liberties Concerns (May 8, 2007), available at 
http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-jh20070508.html. 
81
 Id. 
82
 Volokh, supra note 8. 
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use of racial information on the Rwandan national identification cards to 
facilitate genocide raises an additional concern.  Volokh notes that 
 
in a legal and political system that relies heavily on 
precedent and analogy, the slippery slope is a real risk. . . . 
[For example,] once the government invests money in 
[traffic] cameras, voters might want to get the most law-
enforcement bang for the buck by having the police store, 
merge, and analyze the gathered data.   This slippage isn’t 
certain, but it’s not implausible.83   
 
Lawmakers and citizens must also be alert enough to curtail programs 
where the potential for future abuse cannot be eliminated, even if the 
immediate results are positive. 
 
V. LEGAL CONCERNS 
 
[44]  A second set of concerns which arises when considering the wisdom 
of perfect law enforcement are legal in nature.  Even when law enforcing 
technologies are effective, accurate, and abuse-proof, they may still be in 
tension with the constitution or other important legal doctrines. 
 
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PRIOR RESTRAINT 
 
[45]  Many software programs are being designed to prevent copyright 
infringement.  In cases of performance or copying of media, another term 
for “prevention” could be “prior restraint of expression.”  Courts generally 
presume that restraining speech before it is uttered violates the First 
Amendment, even when the speaker can be punished for the speech after it 
is made.84  Of course, the First Amendment functions differently on 
copyrighted works.  Under the First Amendment, the government may not 
prevent you from publishing a pamphlet, but under the Copyright Act, the 
government may be employed to prevent others from publishing copies of 
                                                 
83
 Id.  
84
 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 722–23 (1971). 
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your pamphlet.85  Similarly, if you place a copyrighted music video on 
youtube.com and claim that the video expresses your feelings much better 
than you could using your own words, the video would undoubtedly be 
speech.86  But you would also undoubtedly be liable for copying the video. 
 
[46]  Courts have historically been quick to dismiss First Amendment 
claims in copyright suits.87  Perhaps the most popular and legally 
successful view of the relationship between the First Amendment and 
copyright is that of Robert Denicola and Melville Nimmer,88 who believe 
that fair use,89 and the idea/expression distinction,90 provide enough limits 
                                                 
85
 See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright 
Has in Common With Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and 
Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).  
86
 This example was originally given by Mark Tushnet in his Free Speech class, Dec. 5, 
2006. 
87
 Tushnet, supra note 85, at 6; see also, e.g., Walt Disney Prods., v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 
751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[D]efendant's [First Amendment] claim can be dismissed 
without a lengthy discussion . . . .”); NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Joint Hearing 
on H.R. 2441 and S. 1284 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of 
the House Judiciary Comm. and the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. (1995) 
(statement of Bruce Lehman, Commissioner of Patents): 
The First Amendment has always provided a completely different 
standard with aregard to liability for actions that constitute speech as 
compared to actions that constitute copyright infringement.  They’re 
really just apples and oranges. . . . [I]t really does a disservice to both 
areas of law . . . to analogize from one to the other. 
88
 See Tushnet, supra note 85, at 6. 
89
 “[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2000).  
90
  
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . . In 
no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea . . . regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.  
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000); see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100–101 (1879) (“Where the 
truths of a science or the methods of an art are the common property of the whole world, 
any author has the right to express the one, or explain and use the other, in his own 
way.”).  
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on copyright to satisfy any concerns about free speech.91  Alternative 
views include, for example, Rebecca Tushnet’s belief that some aspects of 
copyright law may unnecessarily and unconstitutionally infringe on First 
Amendment interests.92 
 
[47]  Although First Amendment issues rarely play a role in copyright 
disputes, the disfavoring of prior restraints of expression in First 
Amendment jurisprudence may still be relevant to perfect prevention of 
copying.  Even in copyright cases, courts have been reluctant to allow 
copyright holders to prevent an expression from reaching an audience.  In 
Stewart v. Abend, for instance, Abend established he owned the renewal 
rights in the copyrighted short story “It Had to Be Murder” and, by 
extension, rights in the story’s derivative work, the movie Rear Window.93  
Abend had sought an injunction against the ongoing distribution of the 
movie, presumably so he could negotiate a very favorable royalty 
agreement, but the Ninth Circuit ruled in Abend v. MCA, Inc. that 
damages, fixed by the district court, should be awarded to him for the 
continued distribution of the film.94  The remedy, which was in essence a 
forced license, displays the court’s reluctance to allow someone the power 
to prevent speech — where in this case, the speech was a film of 
significant value. 
 
[48]  Saying that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Abend v. MCA, Inc. 
demonstrates an implicit repudiation of prior restraint in copyright law 
would be a drastic overstatement.  The makers of Rear Window had 
properly acquired the rights to make the film; the question of whether 
Abend could enjoin the dissemination of the film only arose because 
Cornell Woolrich, the author of “It Had to Be Murder,” died before the 
copyright renewal period for the story had concluded.95  Dying without a 
surviving spouse or child, the copyright reverted to a trust administered by 
                                                 
91
 See Tushnet, supra note 85, at 6; see also Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free 
Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283, 
289–99 (1979); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment 
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1190 (1970). 
92
 See Tushnet, supra note 85, at 6, 27–30.  
93
 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 226- 27 (1990). 
94
 Abend v. MCA, 863 F.2d 1465, 1479–80 (9th Cir. 1988). 
95
 Id. at 1467. 
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Woolrich’s executor, who sold it to Abend.96  Thus, the court’s decision 
may have been motivated by the sense that the complications of copyright 
renewals and reversions should not result in derivative works being held 
hostage—perhaps especially not by individuals like Abend, who had no 
relation to the creator of the original work.  Nonetheless, Stewart v. Abend 
demonstrates that there is some aversion to prior restraint in copyright, 
perhaps one that could only grow to have teeth if significant copyright 
reforms pass. 
 
[49]  Although the First Amendment does not currently protect against 
perfect prevention of copying, the philosophy behind the prior restraint 
doctrine may still be reason to eliminate the wide use of digital rights 
management systems.  Historically, many have argued that the certainty of 
punishment in violating a prior restraint will have a greater “chilling 
effect” on speech than post-speech criminal sanctions.97  Stephen Barnett 
argued for the validity of the prior restraint doctrine because the 
“collateral bar” rule prevents a speaker from challenging the constitutional 
validity of an injunction on speech after the injunction has been 
disobeyed.98 
                                                 
96
 Id. 
97
 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975). 
Prior restraints fall on speech with a brutality and a finality all their 
own.  Even if they are ultimately lifted they cause irremediable loss — 
a loss in the immediacy, the impact, of speech.  They differ from the 
imposition of criminal liability in significant procedural respects as 
well, which in turn have their substantive consequences.  The violator 
of a prior restraint may be assured of being held in contempt; the 
violator of a statute punishing speech criminally knows that he will go 
before a jury, and may be willing to take his chance, counting on a 
possible acquittal.  A prior restraint, therefore, stops speech more 
effectively.  A criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes.  Indeed it 
is the hypothesis of the First Amendment that injury is inflicted on our 
society when we stifle the immediacy of speech. 
Id. 
98
 Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 551–53 
(1977). 
By virtue of [the collateral bar] rule, a newspaper or broadcast station 
subject to a gag order is placed in a trilemma of chilling effects unique 
to a prior restraint situation.  It can comply with the order and take no 
legal steps, thereby accepting the suppression.  It can appeal the order 
directly, but it must obey the interim restraint while it does so . . . . Or it 
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[50]  The “chilling effect” theory can be criticized if one believes that 
injunctions will not restrain speech significantly more than criminal 
sanctions.  But in the context of copyright law, the use of digital rights 
management systems has a chilling effect by its very nature.  A copyright 
holder employs DRM to prevent the copying of its work and to prevent the 
dissemination of speech by preventing it from being uttered.99  The use of 
DRM creates the opposite result of Stewart v. Abend.  Abend was paid 
damages for each instance of copyright infringement that occurred when 
copies of Rear Window were sold or shown, but he could not prevent it 
from being disseminated.100  On the other hand, DRM prevents copyright 
infringing speech in the first instance.101  A potential copyright infringer 
would not suffer the consequences of his actions by paying damages or 
going to jail, but would be unable to infringe a copyright at all.102 
 
[51]  Why might this be problematic?  Could one not see DRM as saving 
the court system and copyright owners a lot of time and money that would 
have been spent trying to punish copyright infringers?  A potential 
problem can be analogized from a traditional First Amendment scenario.  
Consider a situation similar to New York Times Co. v. United States, 
where a reporter has a government secret in his possession that he would 
be punished for publishing.103  In our hypothetical system of perfect 
prevention, the reporter would not be able to publish the material at all.  
However, without perfect prevention, the reporter has a choice: do nothing 
and avoid punishment, or publish the secret and be sanctioned.  The 
reporter has to weigh, in effect, what the secret is worth to the public 
against the value of his own freedom or finances.  People being the self-
interested beings that they are, one would expect this heuristic balancing 
                                                                                                                         
can publish in the face of the gag order, but only at the price of 
forfeiting its legal and constitutional objections to the order and thus, in 
all probability, embracing a contempt conviction. 
Id. at 553. 
99
 See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 
20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 60 (2006). 
100
 Abend v. MCA, 863 F.2d 1465, 1480 (9th Cir. 1988). 
101
 See Armstrong, supra note 99, at 60. 
102
 See id. 
103
 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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to result in secrets important to the public good being revealed and secrets 
that are merely titillating or prurient being held back.104 
 
[52]  In the copyright context, the reporter is replaced with an aspiring 
copyright infringer—a character for whom one typically has less esteem 
but whose role may be similarly important.  The aspiring infringer does 
not trade in secrets and rhetoric but in culture, most of which is legally 
available for a fee.  The aspiring infringer performs a similar balancing 
test as the reporter, asking if the value of the infringement (both to the 
public and to the infringer) is outweighed by the cost of being caught.  
However, unlike in the government secret scenario, fewer would be 
willing to accept this balancing test as justified, primarily because it is so 
difficult to think of how a copyright infringement could be vitally 
important to society. 
 
[53]  However, there are and have been situations when perfect prevention 
of infringement might have been unfortunate.  Consider, for example, the 
infamous Star Wars Holiday Special105 and the critically-acclaimed Grey 
Album.106  
 
[54]  The Star Wars Holiday Special was a two-hour television special 
broadcast in its entirety in the United States only once on Friday, 
                                                 
104
 This argument is similar to the equilibrium argument proposed in Bickel’s A Morality 
of Consent.  Bickel argued that, while the government is entitled to keep things private, 
the government’s power would be frightening if it were not offset by the power of the 
press.  The value of the government’s privacy and the public discourse are irreconcilable, 
and so a balance is struck by the struggle.  BICKEL, supra note 97, at 79–82.  But see Cass 
Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889, 901–02, 904 (1986): 
[Bickel’s] equilibrium theory is vulnerable because it does not address. 
. .   
. . . .  
the actual incentives of the press and government; the respective power 
of the countervailing forces; and what the proper baseline for 
evaluating outcomes should be…[The] equilibrium theory [is] 
impressionistic and relies on premises that are both unsupported and 
unlikely. 
105
 For more information, see Star Wars Holiday Special, 
http://www.starwarsholidayspecial.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
106
 See DJ Dangermouse – The Grey Album Download, http://www.illegal-
art.org/audio/grey.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
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November 17, 1978.107  David Hofstede, author of What Were They 
Thinking?: The 100 Dumbest Events in Television History, ranked the 
holiday special at number one and called it “the worst two hours of 
television ever.”108  It is rumored that Star Wars creator George Lucas 
once said: “[i]f I had the time and a hammer, I would track down every 
copy of that program and smash it.”109  Unfortunately for George Lucas, 
the special has achieved a cult status because VHS and Betamax 
recordings of the broadcast have been copied.110 
 
[55]  The Grey Album, on the other hand, was a “critically praised”111 
collection arranged by Brian Burton (better known as D.J. Dangermouse) 
which mixed tracks from Jay-Z’s The Black Album and the Beatles’ White 
Album.112  Burton complied with notice by White Album rights holder 
EMI to cease and desist distribution of the album, but Burton’s fans were 
not so conciliatory.113  They staged “Grey Tuesday,” during which more 
than 150 sites offered the album for download.114  While Burton 
theoretically could have purchased a license from EMI to use the White 
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Album, the Beatles do not typically allow their work to be sampled even 
for a fee.115  EMI did not file suit, despite their initial protests against the 
album.116 
 
[56]  Both the Grey Album and the Star Wars Holiday Special are serious 
examples of an aspiring infringer’s dilemma.  Is it worth risking a possible 
lawsuit in order to copy significant pieces of culture which are 
contraband?  In the present world which generally lacks perfect 
prevention, the Star Wars Holiday Special and the Grey Album are 
tolerated.  The owners of the special do not want to go through the effort 
to prevent its dissemination and preservation, most likely because they just 
do not care enough to do so and because they do not wish to draw any 
further attention to the show.  EMI may have backed down in the face of 
the widespread disobedience and anger that destroying the Grey Album 
would create.  However, in a world of perfect prevention, an infringer 
could not practice the “civil disobedience” that the Star Wars Holiday 
Special and the Grey Album require to persist, and perhaps the world 
would have significantly less rich speech and cultural landmarks.  There 
would be no uses to tolerate.  Potentially valuable pieces of speech or 
culture such as mash-ups could disappear.  Although the law does not 
currently recognize this concern under the purview of the First 
Amendment, a belief that speech and media should be preserved and 
disseminated should still prevent policymakers from facilitating powerful 
means of perfect prevention. 
 
B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FAIR USE 
 
[57]  A more significant First Amendment issue could be raised if courts 
come to fully accept Denicola and Nimmer’s belief that fair use, along 
with the idea/expression distinction, saves the copyright statute from being 
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.117  Although fair use is an 
affirmative defense to copyright infringement,118 many digital rights 
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management technologies prevent copying which would be fair use 
because they prevent all instances of copying.  Additional barriers to fair 
use copying have been erected since the passage of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”). Section 1201 of the Copyright Act states, “No 
person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls 
access to a work protected under this title.”119   
 
[58]  Although section 1201 provides some limited exceptions to this 
rule,120 it does not include a general exception for fair use.  Section 1201 
seems to say that, so long as a copyright holder can conceal material 
behind a “technological measure that effectively controls access”121 to the 
copyrighted work, the copyright holder can legally eliminate fair use of 
that work.   
 
[59]  Perfect prevention of arguably fair uses does raise some 
constitutional concerns.  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court embraced 
Denicola and Nimmer’s view, stating that although copyrights are not 
categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment, 
copyright law’s built-in free speech safeguards, such as fair use and the 
idea/expression distinction,122 are adequate to address First Amendment 
concerns so long as Congress does not alter the “traditional contours of 
copyright protection . . . .”123  Other courts have also implied that fair use 
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saves the copyright regime from being a First Amendment violation.124  
Thus, section 1201 runs the risk of being unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment on the basis that it effectively makes fair use of a work illegal 
if one must circumvent technology to access it. 
 
[60]  Despite Eldred’s statement that fair use prevents the Copyright Act 
from violating the First Amendment, other cases postulate that the First 
Amendment provides very little protection for fair use.  In Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 125 for instance, the Second Circuit held that the 
DMCA,126 was constitutional even though the law effectively eliminated 
fair uses when copyrighted content was protected by DRM 
technologies.127  Corley was enjoined from posting the DeCSS code on his 
website, a code which allows a person to circumvent CSS, an encryption 
code that prevents the unauthorized viewing and copying of DVDs.128  On 
appeal to the Second Circuit, Corley argued, among other points, that he 
should be allowed to post the DeCSS code because the DMCA violated 
the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause by unduly obstructing the 
“fair use” of copyrighted materials.129   
 
[61]  Although the Second Circuit did not fully “explore the extent to 
which fair use might have constitutional protection, grounded on either the 
                                                                                                                         
Constitutionalization of Fair Use, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 95 (2003), 
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First Amendment or the Copyright Clause . . .”130 because it was beyond 
the scope of the lawsuit, the court nonetheless noted in dicta, “[w]e know 
of no authority for the proposition that fair use, as protected by the 
Copyright Act, much less the Constitution, guarantees copying by the 
optimum method or in the identical format of the original.”131  Thus, while 
the DMCA and CSS may prevent someone from making a digital copy of 
a DVD to, for example, make a documentary for a film class, a fair user 
would be able to “point[] a camera, a camcorder, or a microphone at a 
monitor as it displays the DVD movie.”132  In other words, according to 
the Second Circuit, even if fair use were constitutionally protected, the 
type or form of the fair use could be severely limited. 
 
[62]  Even if fair use were not constitutionally protected at all, its value 
should lead policymakers to question the wisdom of the DMCA and the 
use of DRM technologies which prohibit all instances of copying.  
Preventing fair use copies is similar to a surveillance system which 
experiences too many false positives.  The technology may perfectly catch 
all law violations, but it catches too much, to the detriment and 
inconvenience of those in the “false positive” group (fair use copiers) and 
of all potential and actual fair users.  Policymakers must ask if the benefit 
of perfect enforcement—eliminating media “piracy”133—is offset by the 
cost of preventing fair uses of the media.  After Eldred, however, there is 
significant reason to believe passing laws that prevent fair uses could 
violate the First Amendment.  
 
C. THE NECESSITY DEFENSE 
 
[63]  Another concern about perfect prevention is that sometimes it is 
important to break the law to prevent harm.  At times, exceptions to laws 
are written into statutes explicitly.  For example, several statutes making 
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murder a crime include an explicit exception for self-defense.134  
Similarly, the Copyright Act includes an exception for “fair uses” of the 
copyrighted material.135  At other times, exceptions are not explicit in a 
statute, but are nevertheless recognized by potential litigants, such as 
breaking the speed limit to tear away from danger. 
 
[64]  Simply, there are times when it is ethical and imperative to break the 
law. Amongst ourselves, we may disagree about precisely when these 
situations arise, but most reasonable people would agree that there are 
times when the law does not anticipate the bizarre states of affairs that can 
arise and make lawbreaking necessary.  This reality has been woven into 
our jurisprudence.  The Supreme Court has recognized “necessity” as a 
defense to criminal prosecution in situations where “criminal action was 
necessary to avoid a harm more serious than that sought to be prevented 
by the statute defining the offense.”136  This defense probably exists even 
when no exception is explicitly recognized in a criminal statute.137  The 
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doubt about the viability of the common-law defense, even in the 
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rationale for the rule places great faith in individual judgment; as the Ninth 
Circuit said, 
 
In some sense, the necessity defense allows us to act as 
individual legislatures, amending a particular criminal 
provision or crafting a one-time exception to it, subject to 
court review, when a real legislature would formally do the 
same under those circumstances.  For example, by allowing 
prisoners who escape a burning jail to claim the 
justification of necessity, we assume the lawmaker, 
confronting this problem, would have allowed for an 
exception to the law proscribing prison escapes.138 
 
[65]  In a system of “perfect prevention,” technology could remove the 
ability to break laws in situations where the necessity defense would be 
applicable.  Here, as when we considered prior restraints on speech, 
preventing a law from being broken has a different effect than punishing a 
lawbreaker after the fact.  In cases where a necessity defense could be 
used, whether or not an individual can break a law is critical.  There is a 
need to break the law to avoid some greater ill, and so whether the law is 
broken determines whether the ill was averted.  Any technology which 
prevents law breaking before the fact—for example, one which could 
prevent cars from exceeding the speed limit—risks creating harm by 
failing to allow for situations where law breaking is necessary. The use of 
such technology should be avoided in all cases lacking extremely powerful 
countervailing factors. 
 
D. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 
[66]  Using technology to search computers connected to the Internet has 
the potential to violate the Fourth Amendment.  These issues arise not 
because of the “perfect” nature of the enforcement, but rather because of 
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the types of surveillance technologies which are likely to be used to 
monitor the activities of web surfers and personal computer users. 
 
[67]  Personal computing software and appliances are increasingly 
“tethered,” that is able to relay or receive information from their 
manufacturers.139  A TiVo knows whether it frequently watches PBS or 
Comedy Central and can send this information back to TiVo, Inc.140  This 
is how we know that Janet Jackson’s “wardrobe malfunction” during the 
2004 Super Bowl was replayed three times more than any other moment 
during the Super Bowl Broadcast.141  Because many computers are 
perpetually connected to the Internet, many software programs such as 
operating systems and antivirus programs are designed to automatically 
update themselves.142  Automatic updates change or add code to an 
individual computer.  While most updates are desirable and useful, there is 
nothing to stop an update from adding code which will search a 
computer’s files and documents or turn on the computer’s microphone or 
camera.143 
 
[68]  Tethered appliances make it possible for law enforcement and others 
to perform searches without any obvious intrusion.  The police do not 
have to break down front doors to search through photo albums looking 
for obscenity; they do not even have to physically place a wiretap outside 
of a home.  If there is software on someone’s computer which will do it, 
law enforcement could search that person’s hard drive and send a report 
on what was found without that person ever being aware of the search. 
 
[69]  When, if ever, would such searches raise a Fourth Amendment issue?  
The answer depends on how the searching software was installed on a 
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computer.  If the software is installed voluntarily and the user is informed 
that the information it collects may be shared with government authorities, 
then the Fourth Amendment is unlikely to be activated because the user 
consented to the search.  If the software provider has a privacy policy that 
promises not to share found information, the situation also probably will 
not raise a Fourth Amendment issue.  While laws designed to protect 
privacy may be activated by a private company sharing information about 
its clients, the Fourth Amendment likely would not be at issue.  Fourth 
Amendment case law indicates there is no constitutional problem with the 
government acting on information gathered from third parties who came 
by the information voluntarily.144  “[T]he law gives no protection to the 
wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent . . . .”145 
 
[70]  A particularly relevant situation implicating the Fourth Amendment 
in computer searches was discussed by Michael Adler in his note 
“Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband.”146  Adler asked 
whether there would be a Fourth Amendment issue with what he called a 
“perfect search,” an “automated, wide-scale search that could 
hypothetically scan through hundreds of millions of files but would report 
to authorities only the presence of files containing contraband.”147  Such a 
search would be without consent— the code which allowed the search 
would have to have been installed without the computer user’s 
knowledge—and would be designed to find digital contraband such as 
illegally copied media, child pornography, or other obscenity.148  The 
search program would ignore other material on the computer, even if it 
were illegal or scandalous, and would not be tempted to peek at other 
information as a human investigator would.149  In other words, although 
the searches would take place “dragnet-style”—without probable cause or 
any particular reason to think a given computer contained any 
contraband—the searches would (in Adler’s hypothetical) produce no 
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false positives, have virtually no impact on property, and be virtually 
unnoticeable by the computer user.150 
 
[71]  Prima facie, such a search would appear to violate the Fourth 
Amendment if performed without a warrant.  In the seminal Supreme 
Court decision of Katz v. United States, Justice Stewart explained, “[w]hat 
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, 
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.  But what he seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, must be 
constitutionally protected.”151  People generally expect their digital copies 
of pictures and documents to be as private as those they keep in a file 
cabinet in their home.  After Katz, the Fourth Amendment’s applicability 
would appear certain. 
 
[72]  Two cases following Katz bring this certainty into doubt.  In United 
States v. Place, the Court found that a dog sniffing luggage for narcotics 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.152  Because the sniff did not 
require opening the luggage and exposing non-contraband items, the 
information revealed was limited to the revelation of contraband and did 
not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.153   Some courts initially read 
the Place decision to rest on the fact that odors presumably diffused 
outside of the bags and thus were publicly accessible.154  However, the 
Court emphasized in United States v. Jacobson that the decisive fact in 
Place was that “government conduct . . . could reveal nothing about non-
contraband items.”155  In Jacobson, federal agents tested a sample of white 
powder which had been accidentally discovered and, while destroying the 
sample, verified that it was cocaine.156  The Court explained, 
“governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is 
[contraband], and no other arguably ‘private’ fact, compromises no 
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legitimate privacy interest.”157  Thus, police may search for contraband 
without a warrant so long as the search “could, at most, have only a de 
minimus impact on any protected property interest.”158 
 
[73]  Under Place and Jacobson, it would seem that a “perfect search” 
might get a constitutional free pass so long as the proper safeguards 
against abuse were put in place.  However, the Court has recently adopted 
a more restrictive attitude towards new ways of searching.  In Kyllo v. 
United States, the Supreme Court considered whether law enforcement 
agents could use a thermal imaging device to detect infrared radiation 
from high-intensity lamps typically used to grow marijuana indoors.159  
The majority held, without addressing Place or Jacobson, that when “the 
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore 
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without 
physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant.”160 
 
[74]  What Kyllo means for the constitutionality of the “perfect search” is 
unclear.  The thermal imagers in Kyllo were not directly searching for 
contraband, but rather for legal property—the heat lamps—which is a 
strong indication of contraband.  The search revealed something more than 
the presence of contraband: it revealed the presence of heat lamps, an 
arguably private fact.  Thermal searches might sidestep the Jacobson 
exception to the warrant requirement without the Kyllo decision having an 
impact on the constitutionality of a “perfect search.” 
 
[75]  On the other hand, while a theoretically perfect search might be 
captured by the Place-Jacobson exception, even the best written searching 
programs might reveal more than is constitutionally acceptable under 
Place and Jacobson. Consider that any program would have to install 
itself on the computer it was searching, creating the possibility of 
interrupting or affecting another program’s functioning.  Further, the 
program would have to reveal nothing other than the presence of 
contraband, even private information that is not usually considered 
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sensitive, such as the operating system a person is using.  Any surveillance 
program that could actually be written might be revealing or risk injuring 
property (i.e. other computer programs) and thus fall outside the Place-
Jacobson exception. 
 
[76]  The constitutionality of a perfect search, therefore, may depend on 
the specifics of the search program itself.  Yet, the risk of affecting other 
aspects of a person’s computer may be enough to make all such searches 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
VI. PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS 
 
[77]  Logistical and legal concerns aside, there are numerous philosophical 
and public policy reasons to resist the use of technology to facilitate law 
enforcement. 
 
A. LAW ENFORCEMENT IS MEANT TO BE DISCRETIONARY 
 
[78]  One of the most significant reasons to oppose perfect enforcement is 
precisely because it would catch all instances of lawbreaking.  Perfect 
enforcement of existing laws will not create ideal results, as our laws were 
written and developed to reflect a world where law enforcement was 
imperfect or discretionary.  Furthermore, for a rule to be enforced 
perfectly using technology, the rule must be expressed concisely to a 
computer or similar device; there is no room for a concept as complex as 
fair use.  Such simple expressions of rules will almost necessarily be poor 
expressions of what behavior is actually desirable. 
 
[79]  Historically, laws have not been written or developed with perfect 
enforcement in mind.  Private law or civil action requires one party to 
bring suit against another; as this takes time, money, and effort and is a 
strain on relationships, many potential suits are never brought.  Similarly, 
prosecutors have virtually unlimited discretion over what particular crimes 
to prosecute.  As a result, people often get away with petty law violations 
such as trespassing in a park after dark, driving five miles over the speed 
limit, or committing a noise violation in a residential neighborhood.  A 
person can talk his way out of a speeding ticket if he is speeding to the 
hospital to see a very ill relative.  Even law violations that are considered 
more serious such as prostitution or drug possession often go unpunished 
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due to a lack of resources in the legal system; a prosecutor simply does not 
have the means and time to try to prosecute every case. 
 
[80]  Imperfect application of the law occurs not only because of choice or 
lack of means to enforce.  A law cannot be written to perfectly reflect the 
goals of its author or authors.  This idea has been explored by Frederick 
Schauer.  He explained that most prescriptive rules such as laws are 
“probabilistic generalizations.”161  That is to say, most rules are created 
because following them probabilistically effects some goal.  Consider the 
hypothetical rules “no dogs allowed,” “speed limit 55,” “no one under the 
age of 21 shall consume alcohol” or “thou shalt not kill.”162  All of these 
rules exist because of some justification—that parks and restaurants 
should be clean and quiet, that people should be safe on the roads, that 
irresponsible individuals should not drink, that people should live.  
 
[81]  Probabilistically speaking, following the rules effects these 
outcomes.  Not permitting dogs in a park will usually make a park quieter 
and cleaner; driving under fifty-five miles per hour is generally safe; 
creating a minimum drinking age generally diminishes irresponsible 
drinking; preventing murder keeps people alive.  A rule’s factual predicate 
bears a probabilistic relationship to the concerns of the rule, but in 
particular cases the connection between the justification and the 
consequence is absent.163  Indeed, rules are almost always both over and 
under inclusive.164  For example, when the roads are slippery, it may be 
dangerous to drive at fifty or even forty miles per hour.165  When many 
cars are all driving slightly above the speed limit, it may be dangerous to 
drive below the speed limit.166  Many under twenty-one can drink 
responsibly, and many individuals over the age of twenty-one cannot.167  
Certainly, in many cases, lawmakers recognize that rules are over and 
under inclusive, but opt for rules instead of standards because they are 
easier to apply.  Lawmakers know that when they are preventing twenty 
year olds from drinking, they are preventing some responsible twenty year 
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olds from imbibing and allowing some irresponsible thirty year olds to 
cause a ruckus in the local bar.  Nonetheless, the rule “you must be 
twenty-one to drink” is much easier to apply and administer than a system 
which requires an individualized assessment of everyone’s maturity.  
Rules also make it easier for individuals to understand what the law 
requires; for example, an individual can much more easily judge if he is 
driving over fifty-five miles per hour than he can judge if he is driving 
“safely.” 
 
[82]  For these reasons, rules are enforced even though we acknowledge 
they sometimes reach those they should not. Even so, there are still 
exceptional circumstances that are not written into law but which the legal 
system is often willing to accept as an excuse for breaking a rule. Consider 
H. L. A. Hart’s famous example of a rule that forbids one to take a vehicle 
into a public park.168  Lon Fuller argued that forbidding a statue of a 
vehicle in the park—say, an old tank on a pedestal placed to 
commemorate a war—was inconsistent with any sensible purpose behind 
the “no vehicles in the park” rule.169  Ignoring the jurisprudential questions 
of what a judge should do if actually faced with the question of whether 
the tank should be allowed in the park, one can safely note that it is very 
unlikely anyone would even try to enforce the “no vehicles in the park” 
law against whomever was trying to erect the statue, in part because in this 
case the connection between the consequence of erecting the statute and 
the justification behind the rule (noisy motors or dangerous machines in 
the park are unpleasant) is wholly lacking. 
 
[83]  These kinds of law violations which no one complains about are very 
common in copyright law.  Violators who photocopy their favorite poems 
or stories are not hunted down.  Sometimes, copyright violations are 
allowed to continue unimpeded because the copyright infringer has a 
plausible “fair-use” defense to the infringement.170  Even though a fair use 
defense may not succeed, the likelihood that it will may be enough to 
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make a copyright holder unwilling to go through the effort of bringing 
suit.  Sometimes, copyright violations that are clearly illegal but which 
generate publicity are ignored by copyright holders as well—what Tim 
Wu calls “tolerated uses.”171  Wu notes that “[t]he industry is deeply 
conflicted about mild forms of piracy — trapped somewhere between its 
pathological hatred of ‘pirates’ and its lust for the buzz piracy can 
build.”172 Tolerating these infringements is, essentially, utility 
maximizing.  Those who infringe are let off the hook, and content 
providers get more notice. 
 
[84]  Enforcing laws perfectly eliminates this discretion.  Software which 
prevents copyright infringement prevents not only fair uses of copyrighted 
material but also utility-maximizing illegal uses which might have been 
tolerated.  Further, as commentators have snidely observed, “[u]nless 
DRM [Digital Rights Management] systems include a ‘judge on a chip,’ 
they will remain incapable of determining whether a user is copying part 
of a work for purposes of piracy or parody.”173  Until recently, a copyright 
owner had to affirmatively act to punish a copyright violation.  Now, using 
DRM, copyright owners can prevent many more violations.  The problem 
with perfect enforcement is that, figuratively speaking, it prevents or 
punishes the placement of a tank statue in a park.  Not only are fair and 
tolerated uses curtailed, not only does the woman speeding to the hospital 
get a ticket, but violations of the law that are clearly justified but which we 
cannot anticipate are prevented or punished.  
 
B. THE INHERENT VALUE OF PRIVACY 
 
[85]  Among the most difficult to articulate aversions to perfect law 
enforcement is the sense that enforcement methods violate privacy.  
Lillian BeVier wrote, “[p]rivacy is a chameleon-like word, used 
denotatively to designate a wide range of wildly disparate interests—from 
confidentiality of personal information to reproductive autonomy—and 
connotatively to generate goodwill on behalf of whatever interest is being 
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asserted in its name.”174  Several commentators, notably William L. 
Prosser175 and more recently, David J. Solove,176 have attempted to give 
the concept a more rigorous definition by providing a taxonomy of the 
various interests the word “privacy” can denote.  The instantiation of 
privacy invasion which perfect enforcement implicates is that which 
Prosser called “intrusion upon [one’s] seclusion or solitude, or into his 
private affairs”177 and what Solove identified as “surveillance”178 and 
“intrusion.”179  Intrusion differs from surveillance in that it need not 
involve the gathering of information; rather, the harm of intrusion is its 
interference with solitude, or one’s ability to retreat from the presence of 
others.180 
 
[86]  With these types of privacy invasions in mind, one can ask if there is 
an inherent value in privacy—freedom from surveillance and intrusion, 
even if one has nothing to hide, even nothing to be embarrassed about—
which could be threatened by various technologies.  Certainly, being 
stared at for extended periods of time can be “invasive and penetrating and 
also disturbing, frightening, and disruptive.”181  But these feelings of 
discomfort lack substance; they do not seem strong when compared to 
arguments that cameras decrease crime and traffic accidents and that 
searches of computer files are necessary to discover and destroy child 
pornography rings.  If one has nothing to fear from surveillance, can an 
interest in privacy ever trump a legitimate policy interest in preventing 
crime and injury? 
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[87]  Philosopher Thomas Nagel has made progress in giving substance to 
these kinds of privacy interests, specifically arguing that it is necessary for 
individuals to have privacy in order to maintain both a public and private 
identity.  According to Nagel, what we seek when we seek privacy is 
concealment, and “[c]oncealment includes not only secrecy and deception, 
but also reticence and nonacknowledgment.”182 Reticence and 
nonacknowledgment are not dishonest.  Often, all know the concealed 
truth.  Rather, reticence and nonacknowledgment maintain social order, 
comfort and respect, and avoid conflict.183  Nagel offered the example of 
two individuals, A and B, at a cocktail party.184  A recently published a 
terrible review of B’s book.185  Neither of them acknowledges this; rather 
they talk stiffly about politics and real estate.186  But, consider the 
alternative, A announcing, “You conceited fraud, I handled you with kid 
gloves in that review; if I’d said what I really thought it would have been 
unprintable; the book made me want to throw up — and it’s by far your 
best.”187  B knows that A thinks this, but would rather be spared the 
experience of being faced with the cruel comments.188 
 
[88]  Similarly, consider two friends or public figures who are known for 
being emotional and who are going through a bitter divorce.  Everyone 
may know that they have had vitriolic arguments and said hateful things; 
perhaps the two individuals have acknowledged that this is the case.  But, 
having others read the transcript or hear a recording of these arguments, 
even if they are precisely as imagined, is degrading and uncomfortable for 
the two arguers.  It is the exposure itself which causes a concrete injury, 
even if what is exposed is not a secret. 
 
[89]  Reticence and nonacknowledgment are thus useful, but they are 
exercised at a cost.  The book reviewer is very conscientious about not 
saying what he thinks; the divorcees refrain from sharing their thoughts 
with most people they encounter each day.  And, just as one needs to 
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physically relax after standing all day, these individuals must also relax by 
turning off their performance in private or with confidants. 
 
[90]  Surveillance pressures one to exercise reticence and 
nonacknowlegment more often, creating tension between the need to put 
forth a polite and socially acceptable persona and the need to act without 
consideration for social norms in private. Knowing that someone has 
filmed one driving, is scanning one’s computer files, or is keeping tabs on 
what television one watches has subtle effects on a person’s actions.  One 
may hesitate to rock out to Britney Spears in the car or to TiVo terrible 
soap operas while at work.  The fear that someone else has seen a silly, 
personal moment or habit, even if no concrete harm can come of the 
exposure, is chilling.  Thus, as Julie Cohen notes, surveillance “threatens 
not only to chill the expression of eccentric individuality, but also, 
gradually, to dampen the force of our aspirations to it.”189  This may well 
be true, but one is right to ask if the mere dampening of eccentricities is 
enough to limit measures which could end excessively harmful child 
pornography, deadly traffic accidents, and even terrorist plotting. Nagel 
argues, 
 
The public gaze is inhibiting because, except for infants 
and psychopaths, it brings into effect expressive constraints 
and requirements of self-presentation that are strongly 
incompatible with the natural expression of strong or 
intimate feeling.  And it presents us with a demand to 
justify ourselves before others that we cannot meet for 
those things that we cannot put a good face on. The 
management of one’s inner life and one’s private demons is 
a personal task and should not be made to answer to 
standards broader than necessary.190 
 
In essence, Nagel argues that without privacy in which to deal with 
socially inappropriate inclinations or strong emotions, we would lose our 
ability to function appropriately (i.e. to exercise nonacknowledgment and 
reticence) in public and cause social breakdown. 
                                                 
189
 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000). 
190
 NAGEL, supra note 182, at 17–18. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 4 
 
43 
[91]  To those concerned with privacy and discretion, Cohen and Nagel’s 
worries seem justified.  For others, the effects they warn of sound alarmist.  
Since the first season of Survivor on CBS, reality television has gained 
such popularity that thousands clamor to be featured on programs that 
openly seek to embarrass and expose raw emotions and loud, petty 
conflicts.  Britain’s closed circuit television (“CCTV”) network of over 
four million public surveillance cameras is widely perceived as “a friendly 
eye in the sky, not Big Brother but a kindly and watchful uncle or aunt.”191  
Even Nagel acknowledges that “what is hidden and what is not may be 
arbitrary.”192  Indeed, the nature of publicly acceptable behavior has 
changed over centuries and differs across cultures.  The current popularity 
of blogs and reality television and the non-reaction to Britain’s CCTV 
system indicates that the degree of privacy one needs may be somewhat 
elastic. 
 
[92]  Nonetheless, the writers of blogs and the cast of reality series are 
volunteers, and British citizens being monitored by CCTV are already 
subjected to the human public’s gaze. More importantly, computers and 
cameras eventually turn off, and the British pedestrian eventually returns 
to the privacy of her own home.  These individuals still maintain privacy 
because they, like everyone else, need it in some degree. Nagel argues, 
“we need privacy to be allowed to conduct ourselves in extremis in a way 
that serves purely individual demands, the demands of strong personal 
emotion.”193 And he is correct. Most people would go mad if the paparazzi 
followed them around and eavesdropped on their every conversation or if 
video cameras were placed inside every person’s home.  But if the human 
need for privacy is somewhat elastic, the risk of harm in other cases may 
be harder to assess. Does Nagel’s argument also undermine the rationales 
for traffic cameras or computer document searches? 
 
[93]  As computers become more deeply woven into people’s lives, the 
notion of searching computer files seems only marginally less invasive 
than sticking a camera in someone’s home.  Increasingly, pictures, diaries, 
and financial information are being stored electronically.  Individuals’ 
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private selves are often as much embodied in their personal computers as 
in their file cabinets and leather-bound journals, and so Nagel’s argument 
is about as persuasive for computer searches as it is for in-home cameras. 
 
[94]  Whether the presence of public cameras is an unjustified privacy 
invasion is less clear.  Red light and speeding cameras are only placed in 
locations which are already in public, where one can already be seen.  The 
greater permanence of the camera’s recording may incline a person to 
restrain her eccentricities more than usual, but publicly placed cameras 
may be the kind of privacy invasion to which humans can adapt. 
 
[95]  The degree of harm surveillance causes thus depends on what 
technology is being used and where the surveillance is occurring.194  
Society and individuals’ interests in avoiding these harms are relevant 
even when an invasive technology is being used successfully to enforce 
laws that all agree with, for, as Nagel argues, society cannot function 
without sufficient space to be one’s private self.  
 
C. BALANCE OF GOVERNMENT AND INDIVIDUAL POWER 
 
[96]  A final concern is that using technology to enforce laws will 
unwisely shift power to the government and from the individual.  This 
notion of a “balance of power” between the government and its citizens is 
evoked in the Second Amendment.195  Its meaning, concerning the “right 
of the people to keep and bear arms,”196 has undergone much 
consideration.  While most federal appellate courts have stated that the 
amendment is a “collective right” that only protects the private possession 
of weapons in connection to the function of a state citizen’s militia,197 the 
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D.C. Circuit has recently joined the Fifth Circuit and a number of state 
courts in holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s 
right to keep and bear arms.198  One rationale for allowing individuals to 
keep firearms is to maintain the people’s ability to resist tyrannical 
government.199  In order to prevent abuse of government power, one might 
believe not only in separation and balance of powers among the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches, but also in the need for a 
balance of power between the government and the people themselves.  
This sentiment is present not only in some interpretations of the Second 
Amendment, but also in the limited powers of Congress200 and in the 
Tenth Amendment.201 
 
[97]  Just as forbidding individuals from possessing firearms shifts power 
in favor of the government, using technology to enforce laws also shifts 
the balance of power between the government and the individual.  
Historically, the government has been made up of individuals, all of whom 
had to be willing to participate in law enforcement actions.  To issue a 
speeding ticket, a police officer needed to pull over the speeding car, write 
the ticket, and appear in court if the ticket was challenged.  This effort was 
roughly commensurate with the inconvenience to the driver of having to 
wait to receive the ticket and appear in court to challenge it. 
 
[98]  When a camera automatically issues tickets without an element of 
human discretion, however, the balance of power is shifted.  The 
government trivially exerts its power—no one even has to look at the 
tickets as they are being mailed out.  The alleged perpetrator receives a 
ticket in the mail, stating that some amount must be paid or the perpetrator 
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must show up in court.  In court, the evidence is the photographs or the 
video; a police officer need not take the time out of his day to testify as to 
what he saw.  Similarly, the RIAA could choose to send notice and 
takedown letters automatically with minimal human oversight if their web 
crawlers became more accurate.202  The provider of the allegedly 
infringing content would have to explain that the use of copyrighted 
material was fair, that there was some mistake, or that the material was 
accessed under one of the DMCA’s exceptions.203 
 
[99]  The procedural safeguards of the court system may provide some 
insulation from this imbalance.  The Minnesota Supreme Court, for 
instance, recently struck down a red light camera program as being in 
conflict with Minnesota state law, which preempts Minnesota traffic 
laws.204  Under the ordinance describing the camera program, the owner of 
a car caught speeding was presumptively guilty of a misdemeanor.205  
However, Minnesota law provided that a defendant be “presumed innocent 
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”206  The problem, the 
court explained, was that the presumption that the owner was the driver 
eliminated the presumption of innocence and shifted the burden of proof 
from the government to the defendant.207  As a result of the decision, even 
if the cameras continue to be used, the government’s power to prosecute 
traffic violations will be diminished and closer to the power of individuals 
in defensive postures. 
 
[100]  While courts may correct certain shifts in the balance of power, 
other government initiatives may be more difficult to challenge.  In The 
Company v. United States, a company that provides an OnStar-like 
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system208 for cars anonymously brought suit, objecting to the FBI’s use of 
the system to eavesdrop on suspected criminals.209  The FBI had not 
merely eavesdropped on telephone conversations using the system, but 
rather had remotely reprogrammed the microphone so all conversations in 
the car could be overheard.210  The company believed they were not 
legally required to comply with the district court order to allow 
eavesdropping.211  If the company had not objected, there may not have 
been a way for the suspects in the car to object, in large part because they 
had no way of knowing the eavesdropping program existed. 
 
[101]  Before tethered appliances, the exercise of government power was 
checked by the many who actively participated in the programs, both as 
agents of the government and as cooperating private parties.212  In The 
Company, only the company was in a position to challenge the 
government’s behavior.  As surveillance becomes more automated, fewer 
and fewer parties will be in this position.  In effect, the popularity of 
tethered appliances “diminishes the ability of a rule to attain legitimacy as 
people choose to participate in its enforcement or at least not stand in its 
way.”213 
 
[102]  James Wilson explained at the Constitutional Convention, “[l]aws 
may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and 
yet not so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them 
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effect.”214  The ability of individuals to disobey or refuse to enforce laws 
can provide lawmakers with the pressure and incentive to re-evaluate the 
wisdom of laws.  Federal alcohol prohibition was eliminated not only due 
to widespread disobedience, but also due to the apathy of many non-
drinkers who did not report bootleggers and the willingness of some law 
enforcement officials to turn the other cheek.215  Today, California state 
police officers’ unwillingness to help enforce federal law prohibiting the 
use of “medical marijuana” is creating pressure to change federal drug 
laws.216  This type of pressure is more difficult to create when laws are 
enforced automatically.  Systems of “perfect prevention” will eliminate 
the opportunity for civil disobedience entirely, and systems of “perfect 
surveillance” will require far fewer officials and private individuals to go 
along with the program.  Overall, perfect enforcement will decrease 
society’s ability to gain the momentum needed to bring about changes to 
unjust or unwise laws. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
[103]  This Article has cataloged and explored several concerns one might 
have about using technology to enforce law, embracing the use of 
technology in some cases and repudiating it in others.  Each concern was 
illustrated with examples ranging from traffic cameras to web crawlers to 
identification cards.  Yet, the use of such a catalog is not principally in its 
application to these particular cases, but in what might be learned and 
applied to those we encounter in the future. 
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[104]  With a view towards these future, unknown cases, this article 
concludes not with a summary, but with a list of questions that 
policymakers and technologists can use to determine whether the use of a 
technology to enforce law is wise.  
 
1. Is it feasible to use the technology for the proposed purpose? 
2. Will the technology generate an unreasonably high number of 
false-positives or false-negatives?  If so, can these mistakes be 
corrected with the addition of a human element? 
3. What are the potentials for abuse?  What are the possible side-
effects of the technology being used?  Can these potentials be 
eliminated without making the technology ineffective? 
4. Might the use of the technology trigger a First or Fourth 
Amendment violation? 
5. If the technology’s use is constitutional, might the use still 
unwisely curtail speech or fair uses? 
6. If the technology is designed to perfectly prevent a law 
violation, are there any circumstances under which it would be 
important or necessary to violate the law for a greater good? 
7. Is the elimination of discretion in the law’s enforcement 
problematic? 
8. Does the technology intrude on one’s private space enough to 
chill eccentric behavior or affect one’s ability to function 
publicly? 
9. Does the use of the technology unwisely shift the balance of 
power between the government and its citizens? 
 
[105]  Questions 1 and 4 are deal-breaking; any program must be feasible 
and must be constitutional.  The other questions are factors that may often 
cut in opposing directions, ultimately requiring a decision-maker to make 
choices based on the totality of the circumstances.  If these questions are 
considered, such choices will be informed and justified, allowing 
technology to be used without abusing those it is employed to protect. 
